VITA is reported to be planning on making a motorable road from Binshai Pass in Dir, Pakistan through the alaqadari of Dangam to Asmar. ACLU has reportedly finished work on a bridge spanning the Kunar River at Barikot linking Kunar to Chitral at the border post of Arandu. ALCU is also reportedly at work on repairing the road from Barikot down in the direction of Asmar. The major segment of the primary road which remains without a plan for repair is the stretch between Chaghaserai and Asmar. It was suggested to the team that, aside from this road, future road repair work in the province be focused more on the secondary road system. The members of the mission feel that there is some merit in this observation. However, there are specific points along the primary road system where it seems that a finite expenditure of UN resources would have a key impact on the transport system. One of them, the Shigal bridge, has been noted in past reports. This mission recommends that serious consideration be given to accepting a proposal from an implementing partner to repair this bridge as well as the bridge at Hajiabad, north of Asmar. Repair of these two bridges along with a plan for the repair of the segment of road which they are a part will open up Northern Kunar for refugee return and for the efficient supply of agricultural inputs.

Finally, as has been noted in previous reports, the widening and repair of the bridge in Nangalam across the Pech River would greatly enhance the transport of supplies and inputs into Pech and Nooristan.

4.b.2. <u>Ferries.</u>

The question of water transportation is a key one for Kunar. At present, there is only one motorable bridge spanning the Kunar River in the province. Before the war, there were four ferries in operation, at Marawara, Sarkani, Chaoki and Noorgal. The mission visited the sites of the ferries at Marawara, Sarkani

and Chaoki. The Marawara ferry is operating, but the cable has been damaged. It is an important component of the commercial network in Kunar. From observation and discussions with several merchants in Asadabad and other places, the Marawara ferry is a major link in the process of bringing commercial goods (including fertilizer and food) from Bajoor in Pakistan into Kunar. The Sarkani ferry has been destroyed. The Chaoki ferry is operating without a cable using a makeshift raft balanced on inflated truck inner tubes and animal skins.

The mission recommends that the ferry system in Kunar be repaired and improved. In this regard, it should be noted that traditionally each ferry is managed by an individual family. Any assistance by the UN, while aimed at helping to facilitate the transport of goods should not be offered in such a way as to damage the role of these families in the context of river traffic in Kunar.

4.b.3. Telephone and Electrical Supply.

It should be noted for consideration at a later date that a telephone network existed in Kunar prior to the war. All uluswali and most alaqadari centres were linked by telephone lines. Unfortunately, much of the equipment has been destroyed or disappeared. While the poles exist everywhere, the copper telephone wire has been cut and collected, at first for military reasons but then it was reportedly sold in Pakistan at bulk weight for private profit.

Asadabad and its environs was the only community in Kunar with an electric plant prior to the war. As noted in previous reports, the electricity requirements for Asadabad were met by a hydroelectric plant funded by UNDP during the early 70s. The plant has two turbines. One is damaged. The other seems to be partially in operation. For unexplained reasons it is not being used for production of electricity in the town. The men guarding the plant had an electric light bulb fixture which they occasionally turn on to test the power of the turbine.

The mission was informed by the Salafian Shoura in Asadabad which claims responsibility for the hydroelectric plant that they have plans in the near future for bringing tools and qualified engineers from Pakistan to repair the system. The mission was told that the equipment needed to repair the plant had arrived in Karachi, but that the requisite engineers needed to do the repairs had not yet been identified.

V. SOCIAL PROGRAMMES

5.1. Health.

The December UN mission to the area saw a much different picture than the team did in July. The interest in Kunar is nowhere better reflected than in the medical facilities. The medical/health situation is a very good indicator of the political situation within an area. If it is divided between groups a monitor will see multiple clinics sponsored or supported by all of the different factions. This was the case in Kunar.

In December 1988, at the time of the initial UN mission there were reportedly only a few health posts in the whole area. By July 1989, the monitoring team was able to visit over 30 health posts from various sources of support within a relatively small geographic area.

In the Annex (Annex 2) there is a map indicating the placement of health posts within the areas visited. Specifics regarding the information gathered from each health post have been entered into the WHO Health database for ongoing monitoring of conditions in Kunar. Additionally, there is a summary listing of all facilities visited which has been cross-referenced with 1979 population information.

In the context of the medical team's visit, the terms of reference were related more to the monitoring of the available manpower, the placement of health facilities and the logistics of the health field rather than to any type of health survey. It was important to describe the health workers in place and the conditions in which they are working. This involved all of the monitors' time. The aim was not to describe the populations' health status.

Prior to leaving Pakistan, the WHO team visited the coordinating agencies and individual groups to collect information in relation to what was to be anticipated in Kunar. The WHO Health database reflected over 148 reported individuals working either together in health facilities or alone. What was actually found on-site very seldom correlated with what was to be had on paper. The changes represent:

1) New facilities or workers placed that were not expected. This was particularily true of agencies tending to work separately from the coordinating agencies in Peshawar.

2) Workers or facilities expected that were not found. This is particularily true for lower level workers in the first aid or basic health catagories.

3) Consolidation of workers together into health posts of larger size without the knowledge of the supporting agency or agencies in Peshawar.

Therefore, the picture presented in Peshawar was a very poor representation of what was found on site visit. This basic fact has been repeatedly shown on previous monitoring missions by independent monitoring teams such as Coordination of Medical Committees (CMC). The discrepancy must be understood to reflect a general fact related not only to Kunar but to all of Afghanistan.

Specific to Kunar:

In the last years of the Daoud Regime, there was increased interest in Kunar province. During this time numerous facilities for health were constructed relative to other provinces. These facilities overall are in good condition and always of interest to the surrounding communities in terms of reconstruction.

Referring to the population estimates based on pre-war figures, these numbers stem from the gazeteer. The present population base was very unclear. The best information available is based on estimates given during community interviews. The UNHCR datagathering team has also collected this information more recently.

There is no clear definition regarding certain terms. The WHO team has elected to utilize ACBAR/CMC standard health worker levels whenever possible to describe the level of training. With regard to the "facility" the definitions are quite unclear. The description of "hospital" or "clinic" is not meaningful. A description of the specific site and facilities available without categorization is attempted in Annex 2. Each facility visited is described is some detail with specific recommendations. More general recommendations for the health system have also been included.

5.2. Education.

The mission found one or more madrassas of varying size operating in all the main population centres in Kunar (Asadabad, Nowabad, Narang, Sarkani, Chaoki, Khas Kunar, Bar-kende, Nangalam and Belgram). In some cases girls were attending classes.

Most people who discussed education in interviews, expressed a desire for an expanded school curriculum that would include subjects such as maths, science and language study. There was a great deal of enthusiasm for a plan that ISRA (Islamic Relief Agency) and Muslim World League had discussed with the central Kunar Shoura for the construction of lycees (secondary schools) at Asmar, Pech, Chaoki and Khas Kunar.

Mission members talked with children coming home from school in Belgram (on the road to Barikot) and looked at their textbooks which were non-religious and focused on teaching basic reading, writing and maths.

5.3. Disadvantaged Groups.

5.3.a. The School for Orphans in Chaoki

A visit was made to a school for orphans in Chaoki. 180 students (all male) attend the school, boarding during the week and going home on the weekends. 100 of the students are orphans. The school is being run in a former secondary school that also houses a Basic Health Unit funded by MSH.

The school currently has an Afghan principal and seven Afghan teachers, primarily teaching religion. There are plans to bring two more teachers from Peshawar in the next month, one to teach English and one to teach maths. The students are now studying some maths and they also take sports. All the students have been put at the same level or in the same grade irregardless of age.

There was discussion that the school would eventually be enlarged to include skills training in such areas as masonry, carpentry and mechanics. ISRA (Islamic Relief Agency) is supplying the school with bags of wheat for food.

The school was very neat and in good condition although some repair work needed to be done. The floors of the dormitory rooms were spread with fresh straw with the children's quilts stacked in a corner. The children were storing their books and belongings in ammunition boxes. There were desks and chairs in some of the classrooms and there was a rather impressive library. The kitchen was small, dark and very simple with no storage facilities and a mud hearth at one end of the room.

5.3.b. The School for Orphans in Asadabad/Narang.

The school for orphans in Asadabad is still in the process of being organized. It will be located in a former primary school building on the road to Asmar. The building is in good condition and seems to be under Wahabbi/Salafi control.

The school will apparently be funded by Lajnat al Bir. Teachers will be brought in from Peshawar and it seemed that there was a plan to include secular subjects in the curriculum.

Muslim World League, in cooperation with the Narang Shoura has done a survey of the number of orphans in the Narang area and is preparing to open a school for orphans in Narang.

5.3.c. Women in Kunar.

Members of the mission held some informal discussions with women during the course of the trip although the terms of reference for the trip did not include interviewing women.

Throughout Kunar, women were seen working in the fields, planting maize or rice and threshing or carrying water, tending animals and collecting firewood. One woman who was working with her husband ploughing a field for maize planting in Nishagam (near Barikot) talked about the heavy work and long hours that she kept with her husband in the fields. She had six children of her own and was taking care of two orphans. She said that even though the bazaar in Nishagam has been totally destroyed, she is able to buy salt and cooking oil once a month from a truck that passes through the valley loaded with supplies from Pakistan.

Women generally said that they were allowed to go to clinics and hospitals to see male doctors or health workers and this was confirmed by the mission in discussions with health workers and in reviews of patient log books.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Logistics of Future Monitoring Missions.

There are a number of recommendations which have come out of the experience of this mission regarding logistical arrangements for future monitoring missions.

1) Monitoring Trips should be preceeded by periods of careful preparation. Trip participants should know the social and political background of the geographic area to which they are travelling. They should also be familiar with all activity in the area to which they are travelling which impacts upon the sector within which their monitoring responsiblility lies. Discussions should be held, not only with the relevant officials of UN implementing partners, but with other bilaterally-funded implementing agencies active in the target area.

2) Trips should be kept small. Participants should ideally be working in related sectoral areas. All participants should have clear and detailed terms of reference.

3) Vehicles used on monitoring trips should be driven by professional drivers and not by trip participants.

4) Trip participants should either themselves be fluent speakers of Pushto and/or Dari or be accompanied by UN-supplied translators. On no account should trip participants be forced to rely on outsiders as translators.

5) Arrangements for food and shelter should be worked out, when possible, prior to the departure of missions. The length of this mission as well as future similar missions, it must be emphasized, will strain the nature of local hospitality. Relatedly, proper procedure must be understood by all prospective UN missions and uniformly followed. The arrangements made by prior missions set precedents for future missions and to some extent for other areas of the country. For example, gifts and gratuities offered to people on the first Kunar Monitoring Trip put a great deal of pressure on the second trip to follow suit. An understanding concerning the dividing line between hospitality and legitimate financial arrangements for items such as room and board must be made with relevant local authorities in the target areas or with the security escort prior to departure. As much as possible, given local variations within Afghanistan,

some sort of standard operating procedure should be put into place for all missions of any catagory.

6) Requirements for security must be spelled out in advance. Whether an agreement to provide security should include rental of vehicles, fuel, vehicle repairs, etc. should be clearly set out in future letters of understanding.

I. Introduction.

1.a. The present mission to Kunar was conducted as a monitoring trip with specific terms of reference and particular goals in mind. The mission was, according to those terms successful in all respects. It represented the first occasion for UNHCR and WHO to monitor the implementation of projects that these organizations had funded during three rounds of project proposals from December 1988 to present. The mission was fortunate to follow two other previous UN missions to the province (Salaam 5 in December 1988 and Kunar Monitoring Trip 1 in early June 1989) and to benefit from the experiences of these earlier missions. The terms of the mission however allowed it to conduct a more detailed and comprehensive survey of the state of affairs in Kunar province. The mission (10 days) lasted over twice as long as any of the previous missions to the area. It was able to visit all the uluswalis in Kunar province. Particular attention was placed upon areas where UNHCR and WHO had funded projects as well as areas from which the largest concentration of refugees in Pakistan originate.

1.b. Kunar is an area which has much symbolic value for reconstruction in the Afghan context. Although accurate population figures are difficult to come by, the pre-war population of Kunar was probably between 300,000 and 400,000. Most of these people are presently refugees in Malakand Division in Pakistan. The Kunaris represent just under 10% of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan. Kunar was among the very first areas to challenge control from Kabul. It was also the first province to be vacated by the PDPA regime and come under control of elements of the resistance forces. With the completion of a motorable road from Pakistan via Nawa Pass, Kunar is one of the more easily accessible areas of Afghanistan. Leaving Peshawar in the early morning, one can arrive in Asadabad, capital of Kunar, in time for lunch. Many of the relationships which are now forming in Kunar in regard to reconstruction, the role of the UN and its implementing partners, will have meaning as well for other areas of Afghanistan.

VII. The Project/Programme Cycle.

Many of the details of the monitoring that was conducted on this mission will not be the subject of this brief report. Reports concerning the implementation of the projects funded by UNHCR and WHO in Kunar will be submitted separately by mission participants to their respective agencies for use in discussion with implementing partners. However, some general lessons were learned during the course of monitoring which the mission participants hope will have some utility for specific sectoral project planning in reference to Kunar.

Prior to this mission, both UNHCR and WHO had funded projects inside Afghanistan without fielding specific monitoring missions to assess the quality of the implementation of these projects. (It should be noted that the monitoring capacity in place within Peshawar-based voluntary organizations funding and implementing their own projects, particularly in agricultural support and health, during past years has been minimal as well). The implications of such a situation were understood by both UNHCR and WHO prior to the present mission and were dictated by the internal manpower constraints of all organizations concerned and by the dynamics of the political and security situation prevailing in Afghanistan. Given this background, it should not be surprising to find that the implementation of UN-funded projects was not uniformly according to the terms and conditions of project documents. Some projects had been completed ahead of schedule, forcing monitoring to become ex post facto evaluation. Most projects were behind schedule. One project scheduled to be completed had not even been begun by the time of the mission's visit to Kunar. In some cases, projects were difficult to locate or once located, due to their internal logic, were nearly impossible to constructively monitor and/or evaluate. Although the WHO team consisting of two doctors was clearly technically qualified to conduct the terms of its mission, the UNHCR team, asked to monitor projects in various sectors, did not have the technical expertise to conduct thorough and exact monitoring and evaluation. Fortunately, more by accident than design, one of the UNHCR team members had academic training in civil engineering and thus some observations on road and canal repair projects were possible.

In future funding by UN agencies, the mission members would propose that the following aspects of the project funding cycle be considered:

The United Nations, in some capacity, should take the lead in planning and assessing the specific priority needs of reconstruction and rehabilitation in particular regions, provinces and uluswalis of Afghanistan. Missions such as this one are positive moves in that direction as is the work of START in the area of road repair. More initiatives are required. This mission for example will offer some specific recommendations regarding what members viewed as the priority sectors for funding in some uluswalis in Kunar. The present system, wherein implementing agencies simply offer proposals to the various UN agencies has some serious defects. Consideration should be given to a system where the UN as a whole, or relevant agencies, prepares regional lists of priorities for Afghan provinces, as information becomes available, and requests bids from appropriate implementing partners.

Coordination between funding agencies and implementing agencies should be emphasized at the provincial level. There is a danger that the diverging underlying philosophies of projects being implemented in similar sectors or geographic areas may serve to inject elements of competition, confusion and duplication of effort into the work of all concerned. Examples of implementing agencies paying different rates for unskilled labour on projects within a few miles of one another or of health clinics existing side by side in the same bazaar were not unusual. In the agricultural sector, some agencies were giving away inputs such as fertilizer, seed, etc. while others were demanding some return for inputs supplied to farmers. There is room for differing philosophies of implementation of projects in all sectors, but clearly a degree of coordination and cooperation is desirable.

The United Nations should develop the capacity to provide support and advice to implementing partners on methods of project proposal writing. Guidelines should be prepared which clearly define what is expected of implementing partners both in terms of documentation and in various technical and social aspects of any proposed projects. Project proposals for which

technical specifications are appropriate must have them included with attachments of relevant blueprints or other technical drawings. Project goals and objectives should be carefully stated. UN agencies must recognize that the infrastructure of most potential Pakistan-based organizations is limited. Given personnel constraints and sometimes a history of operating without strict controls, it has been difficult for many agencies to meet UN standards and requirements for accountability. It is possible for the UN to simply refuse to fund projects which do not meet its internal criteria. However, if such a strategy is taken there is a risk that a certain amount of institutional memory and valuable experience will be lost as smaller but highly experienced voluntary agencies disappear in a funding crunch. Yet, it is clear that the UN or other funding agencies cannot accept certain standards of work. While the mission does not suggest modalities for such a situation, it does recommend that some selective voluntary organizations be nurtured (as has been attempted to some degree already) to the extent possible to enable them to meet the requirements of the situation at hand. Finally, in regard to facets of the pre-approval/pre-implementation process, an element which was highlighted during the mission and must be heavily stressed is that prospective implementing partners must provide reasonable proof to funding agencies that they have the support of the community in which they plan to work.

Approval of future projects involving the commitment of funds over a certain ceiling (perhaps $200,000) should be subject to a pre-implementation site assessment by a technically competent UN team in conjunction with participants from the implementing partner's side.

All future projects should be subject to periodic monitoring by UN staff. The frequency of monitoring visits must depend on the specific nature of the cycle of the project to be monitored. Different schedules would clearly be appropriate for projects implemented in different sectors. It is vital that the UN system have the capacity to monitor the projects which it funds. Some monitoring can be done by so-called "generalists", but each project, at least once during its life, should be monitored by persons expert in the

technical aspects of the project. Road construction projects must be looked at by civil engineers. Medical facilities should be visited by doctors or specialists in public health planning. Agricultural projects should be seen by those with the technical experience to make judgements concerning the methods and philosophies chosen by the implementing team.

All future projects above a certain ceiling (perhaps as above) should be subject to evaluation by UN personnel qualified to make judgements regarding the success or failure of the projects at hand based on the internal objectives of the projects.

While there is undoubtedly some value in a degree of UN presence in Asadabad, capital of Kunar, whether through the vehicle of a "SMU" or through some other mechanism, the mission cannot offer any recommendations in this regard. The institution of any such presence has implications beyond the competence of the mission members. It can state however, that there was no evidence during the mission of any security problem or risk in Kunar which could by itself be considered detrimental to the putting in place of any such vehicle or mechanism.

In reference to future planning and funding in all sectors, the UN system as a whole, as well as agencies (specifically UNHCR) in particular, must take stock of the present situation and decide to what extent project funding is intended as a measure of relief and to what extent it is intended as a potential contribution to the development of Afghanistan. The requirements, in regard to planning, monitoring and evaluation, are different in each case. As a case in point, present UNHCR-funded agricultural projects in Kunar are being conducted primarily as relief operations with inputs provided to farmers free of charge and without any expectation of obligation on the part of the farmers. Given the precedent-setting value of all work that is being done at this stage, it seems prudent that this issue be addressed in the immediate future and that certain philosophical decisions be made quickly. While relief style distribution of agricultural inputs may have some place in the efforts to rapidly prepare the way for eventual repatriation, such a system will make later efforts at offering agricultural loans, selling inputs or profit-sharing or other development strategies difficult by raising the expectations of farmers of what the UN is prepared to do as well as capable of doing on their behalf.

The appearance of some degree of civilian governmental structure in Kunar is significant. However, it is crucial that agencies with plans to fund or implement programmes in Kunar make concerted efforts to understand the complex nature of the political structure in the province and act accordingly. There are two shouras based in the provincial capital, Asadabad, who each claim central authority in Kunar.

Most local communities, at the uluswali and alaqadari level have created shouras to decide their local affairs. At each level there, the degree of political unity and sense of purpose varies widely from place to place. Generalities are difficult to make and, on the whole inadvisable. In the struggle for authority and legitimacy which is taking place, there is a risk that development projects aimed at helping the Kunari people in an unbiased way may inadvertantly become points of contention and create conflicts over scarce resources. The mission was fortunate in that it was able to meet with almost all of the influential leaders of the province notably including the Asadabad-based Shouras of both the Alliance and the Wahabi/Salafian groups, the Asmar Shoura, the Pech Shoura (Salafian), and the leaders and several members of the shouras of Khas Kunar, Chaoki and Narang.

Given the complexity of working in Kunar and what has been noted as the "nascent" nature of the political structure there, funding and implementing agencies should carefully reflect before fielding projects and programmes which require a long gesation period and which depend upon social and political stability. Projects of finite duration, designed to quickly repair and/or improve crucial infrastructure (roads, irrigation systems) or projects designed to inject needed inputs (fertilizer, improved seed stock, medicine) or to provide training for Kunaris in Pakistan (for health workers, deminers, agricultural extension workers, etc.) would potentially be appropriate.

1.c. It became quickly apparent during the initial stages of the mission that generalities on a provincial basis are of limited utility. Levels of destruction, instances and nature of population return, patterns and extent of cultivation, degree of political organization and unity vary greatly from place to place in Kunar. Even below the uluswali level there are distinctly different patterns from village to village and valley to valley depending upon local conditions and history. Prospective funding agencies must get beyond the initial reaction of speaking of general destruction and devastation. Certain recommendations in this regard will be submitted later in this report.

1.d. The extended length of this mission as well as its specific and detailed terms of reference separated it from past missions staged from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In many ways, it was a new type of mission. A number of logistical concerns arose during the course of the mission. A series of observations and recommendations have been added for the benefit of future monitoring trips.

II. POPULATIION MOVEMENTS

2.a. Repatriation.

The beginning stages of a repatriation have started in Kunar. It would be a mistake however to suggest that the present trend will continue in a steady flow and result in the emptying of refugee camps across the Pakistani border. From the results of spot interviews with farmers it appears as if most areas of refugee concentration in Kunar (with the notable exception of the Pech valley) are experiencing what could be termed as selective repatriation. An appreciable number of male members of land-owning families are returning to prepare fields and undertake cultivation. Some merchants are returning to test the waters for re-establishing their shops and businesses. With very few exceptions, the refugees who were interviewed left their families behind in Pakistan. In many cases, they explained that different male members of their families took turns in staying with the family units in Pakistan and in returning to Kunar to work in agriculture. As this kind of return is temporary and focused in its nature, it is impossible to assess when it will transform itself into the base for a return of full family units.

III. ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES.

3.a. Agriculture:

While agriculture in Kunar has been seriously affected by the war, a picture of the province as a barren wasteland would be inaccurate. It is important to realize that most of the land in Kunar has been under continuous if limited cultivation for the past ten years. According to interviews with farmers, it appears as if winter wheat crops have been sown almost without exception in most areas of the province since at least the early 1980s. Summer crops (rice and corn), requiring more water, have been severely reduced by the damage which has been done to irrigation canals. The yield of winter wheat crops has also generally, due to lack of availability of fertilizer and herbicides, has been reduced as compared to previous years. As in other sectors, it is crucial to realize that statements about the state of agriculture on a provincial basis are not fruitful. The situation in each uluswali and alaqadari is different and distinct and is intimately tied to the history of the area involved, whose control it was under during the past ten years, how many of its inhabitants remained in place and how many left (and in what pattern) and what the original state of the land was in the first place. By way of illustration, a quick survey of the agricultural situation in the province, broken down by area, is offered in Annex 1.

Presently, UNHCR has funded small-scale agricultural support projects in Asmar, Chaghaserai, Chaoki and Khas Kunar. While agricultural inputs (seed, fertilizer) are important, physical observation by this and prior missions, as well as countless interviews with farmers both in Kunar and in Pakistani refugee villages suggest that the main constraint on the rehabilitation of the agricultural system of Kunar, is the repair, improvement and extension of the existing irrigation system. Specific recommendations were made by the previous two missions to Kunar. We agree for the most part with these recommendations. (See Annex 1 for specific details). Supporting such work on canal systems would make an immediate difference in the life of the people of Kunar. UNHCR has provided funding for repair of the Salar Canal and the Narang Canal which together form one of the major irrigation sources in

central Kunar. WFP has supported repair of the Sarkani and Kerala Canals. A bilaterally-funded organization, Lajnat al Bir, has plans to rehabilitate the canal system of the Pech valley, however it is not yet clear when such work will commence. There are still major canals in Kunar which require maintenance. CARE International has also had plans to implement a major food-for-work public works scheme in Kunar, but the staus of its programme is also unclear at this time.

The desire and the ability of the people of Kunar to reconstruct their own lives should not be underestimated or ignored. What they lack are certain material aids. The resource which they do possess is the will that has sustained them through a decade of refugee life. Humanitarian agencies in their rush to provide material aid to the people of Kunar must be careful not to do so in a way which will squander this valuable resource which presently does exist. The experience of the mission in this regard is significant to note. UNHCR, as noted above, has funded a project to repair the Salar Canal as well as the Narang Canal in central Kunar. Commencement of work on these canals by the implementing agency has been delayed by various factors. The people of the area serviced by these canals have not waited for outside aid to repair their irrigation systems. Local communities have banded together and begun work on these two canals independent of the impending UNHCR-funded project. Many of the leaders involved in these communities were aware of the impending outside-funded project but could not wait. Instead they hoped to provide water to their fields for the summer maize/rice crop. It will be interesting to see what happens when the UNHCR project commences and starts to pay daily wages to the people who are presently repairing these canals of their own volition without pay. This is not to say that projects with outside funding are not required. There is clearly a need for an infusion of aid into Kunar. Projects undertaken in the province, as elsewhere in Afghanistan, must be carefully approached in a manner which does not dampen the spirit of enthusiasm and individual or community enterprise which is presently to some extent there. Aid in agricultural as well as in other sectors should be designed as much as possible to avoid the creation of an overdependence on outside assistance. Aid designated as "relief" should be carefully considered and only provided where absolutely necessary and then only on a limited, short term basis.

Canal repair should be considered one of the main priorities of agricultural support by UN agencies in Kunar. Deteriorated seed stock can be planted and yield a crop. Fertilizers and other inputs are valuable additions, but providing a constant source of irrigation water for as much of the agricultural land in Kunar as possible should be the very first priority for UN-funding.

IV. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

4.a. Demining.

The mission has come away with a fairly basic picture of the situation of mines in Kunar. It was a subject which was brought up in all areas visited. Essentially, mining in agricultural fields and lowland areas is not generally perceived as a serious problem although there are still occasional accidents. Most areas readily identified as mined were in very specific types of terrain such as the slopes of hills which were used by PDPA forces as military posts. The major exceptions to this are the uluswalis of Sarkani and Chaoki which appear to be more comprehensively mined and the mouths of a number of smaller valleys where resistance forces seem to have established supply routes. There is virtually no danger at present from mines on the primary road system with the exception of a few kilometre section of road between Asadabad and Asmar and a certain risk of mines on the road between Pashat and Khas Kunar. The situation on secondary roads is not known. It is reported that some of these roads are heavily mined.

This mission made some progress in focusing discussions on the actual realities of the mine problems in Kunar, but the mission would like to draw further attention to the problem of mines in Kunar by making three specific suggestions.

1) A capacity must be built into the UN system to support implementing partners working in the areas of road and canal repair by providing or matching trained deminers to these organizations.

2) A directed and concerted effort must be undertaken to identify and map areas of mine concentrations.

3) The UN Demining Programme must establish a mechanism to carry out demining efforts inside Afghanistan.

4.b. Transportation and Infrastructure

4.b.1. Roads.

With the notable exception of Pech, all uluswali centres of Kunar are situated along either bank of the Kunar River. The primary road of Kunar originates as a metalled road at Jalalabad, becomes shingled in the viscinity of the alaqadari of Nourgal at the very southern end of the province and travels northward along the western bank of the river, connecting Chaoki, Narang, Asadabad, Asmar and Naray, and then reportedly becomes more and more difficult as it finally extends to Kamdesh and Bargey Matal in Nooristan. Each of these towns represents a commercial and administrative centre for the populations of several valleys accessed by secondary roads stretching out from the road and the river to the east and west. The mission travelled along the primary road from Chaoki up to the village of Nishagam past Asmar. Another road runs parallel from Khas Kunar to Sarkani and then up to Marawara following the eastern bank of the river. This road was travelled from Khas Kunar up to Sarkani. The two roads are linked by the bridge at Nawabad just north of Narang. Most secondary roads are said to be inaccessible by vehicle either because they have always been inaccessible by vehicle or due to mining.

An assessment of road conditions in Kunar is made difficult by the fact that nearly all primary and secondary routes in the province are in need of repair. The question then becomes one of relative need and of the assigning of priorities which is a more difficult and controversial task. The primary road has been severely damaged by ten years of constant traffic by heavy vehicles and tanks. In two places along its length, bridges have been made impassable or hazardous in the extreme by war-related damage. Road maintenance, under conditions of war, has been neglected. Secondary routes have in many cases been mined and have deteriorated due to ten years of neglect.

UNHCR has funded two projects to improve the condition of the primary road system in Kunar. One project is on the segment of the road stretching from Sarkani to Pashat on the east bank of the river and the other is on the segment of the road from Narang to Chaghaserai.

Monitoring Trip 2
to Kunar Province

30 June — 9 July 1989

OPERATION SALAM

United Nations Humanitarian
and Economic Assistance
Programmes relating
to Afghanistan

OPERATION SALAM

MONITORING TRIP 2 TO KUNAR PROVINCE

30 JUNE - 9 JULY 1989

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[Detailed Annexes on specific sectors — e.g. Health — are available from the relevant participating agency]